Interiors Contracting Incorporated et al v. Navalco et al : Brief of Defendant-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Interiors Contracting Incorporated et al v. Navalco
et al : Brief of Defendant-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walker E. Anderson; Parson, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Respondents;
Biele, Haslam & Hatch; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, No. 17096 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2380
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERIORS CONTRACTING ) 
INCORPORATED, and ACTION ) 
FIRE SPRINKLER COMPANY, ) 
la Utah Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Respondents, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
NAVALCO, a Utah Corporation, ) Case No. 17096 
aka NAVALCO OF UTAH, et al., ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC., ) 
) 
Defendant, Cross ) 
Claim Defendant ) 
and Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Appeal from a Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge 
Honorable David K. Winder, Judge 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Walker E. Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
PARSON, BERLE & LATIMER 
Daniel M. Allred and 
Barbara K. Polich 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Defendant, Green 
of America, Inc., Crossclairn 
Defendant and Respondent 
Acres 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Roy G. Haslam and 
Glen M. Hatch 
80 West Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
F ~LED 
~,~,L 2 9 1980 
~-···--- .. -·----· ---- ----- - -- .. ·---------
-· I ,. - ---- r.,.u..+ ll+llh 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERIORS CONTRACTING ) 
INCORPORATED, and ACTION ) 
FIRE SPRINKLER COMP ANY, ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Respondents, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
NAVALCO, a Utah Corporation, ) Case No. 17096 
aka NAVALCO OF UTAH, et al., ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC., ) 
) 
Defendant, Cross ) 
Claim Defendant ) 
and Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Appeal from a Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge 
Honorable David K. Winder, Judge 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
'Walker E. Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
PARSON, BERLE & LATIMER 
Daniel M. Allred and 
Barbara K. Polich 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
;Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Defendant, Green 
of America, Inc., Crossclaim 
Defendant and Respondent 
Acres 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Roy G. Haslam and 
Glen M. Hatch 
80 West Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL • • • • • • • • • . • • . . • . . • 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • . . . 2 
ARGUMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • . • • . 7 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO RULE THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO LIENS AGAINST THE 
REAL PROPERTY INTEREST OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO 
OF UTAH, AND AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT, 
NAVALCO OF UTAH, BASED UPON SUCH LIEN INTEREST 
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO FAIL TO AWARD 
JUDGMENT UPON THE CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT, 
NAVALCO OF UTAH, AGAINST DEFENDANT, GREEN ACRES 
OF AMERICA, INC. • •••••••••..••• 
JUDGE WINDER SO MISLED COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, 
NAVALCO OF UTAH, IN HIS STATEMENTS IN REFERENCE 
TO THE LAW OF THE CASE THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD 
BE GRANTED • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • . 
• • 
• • 
• • 
IV. IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO REFUSE TO AMEND 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT SO THAT THEY WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT, 
NAVALCO OF UTAH, ON ITS CROSS COMPLAINT AGAINST 
7 
13 
14 
DEFENDANT, GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC. • • • • • • 21 
CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TEXTUAL MATERIAL CITED 
Page 
Moore's Federal Practice, Volume IB, page 453 • • • • • • • 19 
CASES CITED 
Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson 7 et al., 464 P.2d 387 (Utah 1970) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
In Re Estate of Mecham, 537 P. 2d 312 (Utah 1975). • • • • • 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 38-1-3, U.C.A. 1953~ Replacement Volume 4B • 
Section 78-7~21, U.C.A. 1953, Replacement Volume 9A 
• • • • 
• • • • 
Rule 63, Rules of Civil Procedure, U.C.A. 1953, Replacement 
11 
7 
21 
Volume 9B • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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Plaintiffs and ) 
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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Respondents recorded liens against property of 
Defendant-Appellant to recover for the cost of material and services 
which they provided for Hungry Hawaiian, Inc., a sublessee from Green 
Acres of America, Inc., Cross Claim Defendant and Respondent herein. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Salt Lake County, Judge David K. 
Winder, held that the necessary relationship to entitle Plaintiffs to 
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a lien grew out of the lease, sublease and letter of acceptance 
involved in this case. Judge Winder failed to rule on the Cross 
Complaint of Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, against Cross 
Claim Defendant and Respondent, Green Acres of America, Inc. Upon 
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment to so provide, Judge Christine M. Durham denied the Motion and 
in addition, also denied Appellant's Motion for New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the decisions of the 
District Court reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, entered into a lease 
agreement under date of January 24, 1975 in which the subject prop-
erty was leased to Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc. (Exhibit 
2-P). The lease required certain construction which was duly 
accomplished. Thereafter, on or about the 17th day of January, 
1978, Green Acres of America, Inc. subleased a portion of the subject 
premises to Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. for use as a restaurant. This 
agreement is Exhibit 3-P in the record. Green Acres of America, Inc. 
submitted a letter, dated January 17, 1978, to Navalco of Utah request~ 
ing permission to enter into the sublease (Exhibit 16-P). Navalco of 
Utah responded as follows: 
_ ')_ 
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"Accepted this 31st day of January, 1978 on the 
condition that on ten days written demand after any 
default in the lease between Green Acres of America, 
Inc. and Navalco of Utah will assign to Navalco the 
sublease and, further this condition and acceptance 
shall not vary any provision or condition of the 
lease between Green Acres of America, Inc. and Navalco. 
(Underlining ours) 
Thereafter, Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. proceeded to engage various 
persons to apply materials to the premises (e.g. Exhibit 2-P), but 
thereafter found itself unable to pay all the amounts due. Liens 
were timely filed against the premises by Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler Company, and 
by Defendants and Cross Claimants, Herbert Bergmann, Economy 
Builder's Supply, Inc., John Darrell Tohara, Lawrence Lincoln, 
Terrance Tohara and Lynn H. Gray dba Gray's Electric (Exhibit 1-P). 
Action was brought by the Plaintiffs to foreclose the 
liens naming as Defendants Navalco of Utah, Green Acres of America, 
Inc. and Roy E. and Carol M. Christensen. Defendants, Green Acres 
of America, Inc. and Roy E. and Carol M. Christensen, filed Motions 
to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. As a result, the Christensens 
were dismissed from the case entirely and dismissals were granted 
to Green Acres of America, Inc. as to all parties except Defendants, 
Lincoln, Tohara and Tohara (see Volume I of pleadings, etc., pages 
343 and 344). Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, filed a Cross 
Claim against Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., claiming that 
pursuant to the provisions of the lease, said Defendant was obligated 
to hold Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, harmless for any loss 
in these proceedings. 
-~-
' 
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Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment as against all Plaintiffs and lien-claim Defendants. 
The Motion was granted and Summary Judgment was entered as against 
all of the lien-claim Defendants (see Volume II of pleadings, page 
536). Judge Durham ruled that none of the lien claimants, including 
Plaintiffs, furnished materials or services at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, con-
tractor or otherwise. Attorney's fees were also awarded in favor 
of Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, as against all lien-claim 
Defendants. 
Prior to denying the Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
the Plaintiffs, Judge Durham permitted evidence by way of testimony 
offered by Jerry Cutshaw, President of Plaintiff-Respondent, Interiors: 
Contracting, Inc., and by Ed Smith, President of Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Action Fire Sprinkler Company (see Transcript of that hearing, Clerk's 
page nos. 1090-1118). The testimony of Plaintiff-Respondent, Interiori 
Contracting, Inc., indicated a possibility of an action based upon a 
conversation which occurred between Mr. Cutshaw and the staff of 
Navalco of Utah prior to the completion of all work on the contract 
wherein an officer of Navalco indicated to Mr. Cutshaw that the fin-
ancial condition of Hungry Hawaiian was good enough to insure payment 
to Interiors Contracting, Inc. for the work and materials furnished 
by them. Interiors Contracting, Inc. then completed the job. The 
issue of estoppel was reserved for trial. 
-4-
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The case was tried before Judge Winder who, for matters 
pertinent to this appeal, ordered as follows (Volume III, of 
pleadings, etc., pages 741-745): 
A. Ruled that on the basis of the lease, sublease 
and letter of January 17, 1978 consenting to the sublease, a lien 
was created in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Defendant-
Appellant, Navalco of Utah. This ruling was directly in conflict 
with the rulings which Judge Durham had made on the Motions to 
Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment upon which she had acted. 
B. Judge Winder made no ruling on the Cross Claim of 
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, against Defendant, Green Acres 
or America, Inc. Motion was then made by counsel for Defendant-
Appellant, Navalco of Utah, seeking amendment of the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to award judgment on its Cross 
Claim against Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., and a Motion 
for New Trial was also made. These Motions were denied by Judge 
Durham, who heard these matters inasmuch as Judge Winder had prior 
to that time resigned from the District Bench. 
Appellant Navalco of Utah's failure to assert its Cross 
Claim at the time of trial arose from the following facts (Volume 
III, of pleadings, etc., pages 899-902): 
Counsel for the two parties had been negotiating to settle 
the question of attorney's fees on the Cross Complaint, but had not 
been able to reduce their agreement in writing in time for the trial. 
At the close of the presentation of the testimony by Defendant-
-5-
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Appellant, Navalco of Utah, Ms. Barbara Polich, attorney for Green 
Acres of America, Inc., represented to the Court that the parties 
had a tentative settlement agreement and that no further testimony 
was required as between them. Counsel for Navalco of Utah assented 
to this. However, the settlement agreement was never finalized. At 
the same time, all of the evidence necessary to establish Navalco 
of Utah's rights under its Cross Complaint against Defendant, Green 
Acres of America, Inc., was admitted in evidence. Furthermore, 
Defendant Navalco of Utah's Trial Memorandum did state that this 
was one of the issues of the case. 
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, argued that its 
counsel was misled by Judge Winder's statements during trial to 
Mr. Anderson that he was following the law of the case as 
established by Judge Durham and that the Plaintiffs could recover 
only if they produced evidence indicating some sort of an agency 
or express agreement existed or could be established between 
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, and the lien claimants 
themselves. His ruling was such that it encouraged counsel for 
Navalco of Utah to believe that no further steps need be taken 
with reference to the Counterclaim. 
r 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO RULE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE ENTITLED TO LIENS AGAINST THE REAL PROPERTY INTEREST 
OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, AND AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, BASED UPON SUCH LIEN INTEREST. 
II. IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO FAIL TO AWARD JUDGMENT 
UPON THE CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, 
AGAINST DEFENDANT, GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC. 
III. JUDGE WINDER SO MISLED COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF 
UTAH, IN HIS STATEMENTS IN REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF THE 
CASE THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
IV. IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO REFUSE TO AMEND THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT SO 
THAT THEY WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT, NAVALCO 
OF UTAH, ON ITS CROSS COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT, 
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO RULE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE ENTITLED TO LIENS AGAINST THE REAL PROPERTY INTEREST 
OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, AND AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, BASED UPON SUCH LIEN INTEREST. 
The pertinent statute is Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, Replacement Volume 4B: 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached -
Lien on ores mined. Contractors, subcontractors and all 
persons performing any services or furnishing any materials 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials 
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working 
of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or 
deposit; and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifica-
tions, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superinten-
dence, or who have rendered other like professional 
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
-7-
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property upon or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor or furnished materials, for 
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or 
materials furnished by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting 
by this authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. 
Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the 
owner may have in the property, but the interest of a 
lessee of a mihing claim, mine or deposit, whether 
working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes 
of this chapter include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises included within 
the lease. 
The critical phrase of the above statute is, "whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise." 
In Judge Winder's Memorandum Decision of December 13, 
1979, at Page 2, II A, he stated as follows: 
"A. The Court finds that Navalco impliedly 
authorized Interiors and Action Fire to furnish to 
Navalco's premises labor and materials they furnished. 
This finding of implied authorization is premised 
entirely on what is contained in the master lease, 
Exhibit 2, the sublease, Exhibit 3, and the acceptance 
of the sublease by Navalco, Exhibit 16, and is further 
premised on the work contracted for by the parties to 
these documents and which was done for them by Interiors 
and Action Fire." 
The Court then states: 
"Said finding is not premised on any other circumstance" 
and then goes on to make an exception for the case of estoppel against 
Navalco and in favor of Interiors Contracting (which we do not dispute' 
The original lease between Navalco and Green Acres provided 
for some $100,000 worth of work to be done on the premises and was 
accompanied by a loan in that amount to finance the same. As the 
records show all of such work was completed and paid for some three 
-8-
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years before the events upon which this case is based. (See Exhibits 
D-73, D-74, D-75, D-76, D-77, D-78, D-79 and D-80. Exhibits D-79 and 
D-80 trace the disbursement of all of the 1975 construction funds. 
Also see Transcript pages 103-107, Clerk's pages 1223-1227.) 
Certainly, nothing in the documents to which Judge Winder 
refers, that is the master lease, Exhibit 2, the sublease, Exhibit 
3, and the acceptance of the sublease by Navalco, Exhibit 16, meets 
the statutory test set forth hereinabove. 
The labor performed and the materials furnished were 
furnished clearly at the instance of Hungry Hawaiian. Appellant 
merely consented to the sublease and made a specific reservation 
"that this condition and acceptance shall not vary any provision 
or condition of the lease between Green Acres of America, Inc. 
and Navalco." 
It should be kept in mind that in the absence of the 
mechanics' lien statutes no right at all would exist as between 
parties not in privity. Therefore, a statutory lien right must be 
based strictly upon the terms of the statute. Indeed, the lower 
court failed to find any evidence that Hungry Hawaiian, the sub-
lessee, was acting as agent, contractor or otherwise for Appellant, 
but based its decision on the recited documents only. 
This matter has been dealt with most recently in the case 
of Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson, et al., 464 P.2d 387, 23 
U.2d 395 (Utah Supreme Court, 1970). 
-9-
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The Court states the question at page 389: 
"The critical issue of the instant action is whether 
Zions impliedly authorized the architectural services and 
thus impliedly granted its lessee authority to bind its 
fee interest." 
The Court goes on to state: 
"The trial court found as a matter of fact that the 
lessee had been granted implied authority to bind the 
lessor's interest by the following: (a) The provisions 
of the option to lease and the lease; (b) Approval of 
preliminary sketches; (c) Execution of zoning variance 
applications and appearances and participation in zoning 
hearings; (d) Approval of architectural services ••. " 
The Supreme Court of Utah rejected the trial court's find-
ings and reversed, stating at page 389: 
"The facts to support findings (b) and (d) were merely 
expressions of knowledge of the lessor that the lessee was 
proceeding with the development of the property and do not 
constitute an implied authorization. Zion's participation 
in the zoning hearings was in compliance with the specific 
provisions of the lease, which cannot be distorted into 
an agency agreement ••• " 
The Utah Supreme Court quoting Utley vs. Wear, 333 S.W. 2d 
787, (Mo.App., 1960), states: 
"If, on account of the shortness of the lease, the 
extent, cost and character of the improvements, or other 
facts in evidence, such as the participation by the lessor 
in the erection or construction thereof, it can be seen 
that the improvement is really for the benefit of the 
lessor, and that he is having the work done through his 
lessee, then it can be said with justice that the lessee 
in such case is acting for the lessor." 
The facts in the instant case are far removed from such a 
test. In the case here, the lessee was approximately three years 
into its primary term with an option for a five-year renewal there-
after. The construction work was for a restaurant, which certainly 
-10-
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cannot be said to have value to the Appellant at this time. Any 
future value to Appellant is entirely spectulative. We submit that 
the Zions First National Bank case is direct and positive authority 
against Judge Winder's decision and dispositive of this issue. 
Judge Winder did not handle this case from the beginning. 
The documents construed and relied upon by Judge Winder in his 
decision were all dealt with exhaustively by Judge Christine M. 
Durham much earlier in the case. 
In the earliest phases of the case, counsel for Defendant, 
Green Acres of America, Inc., filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint and also the Cross Claims of the lien claimant Defendants. 
On February 20, 1979, Judge Durham issued a Memorandum 
Opinion (see Volume I of Third Judicial District Court Appeal, record 
of pleadings, etc., page 343 and 344). 
The Court ruled "Defendant, Green Acres of America, lessee, 
did not contract for the improvements made by Plaintiffs; nor did it 
do anything to induce reliance by Plaintiffs, nor was its lessee 
its agent in contracting for the services and materials. Therefore, 
a lien may not attach to its property. The motion for failure to 
state a claim is granted ••• ". 1 
Thereafter, Appellant, Navalco of Utah, filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiffs and all Defendant lien 
1The case of In Re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 
1975) expresses the law in the jurisdiction concerning the ability 
of one district judge to overrule another judge in the same case. 
-11-
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claimants. This raised the same basic issue as Judge Durham had 
ruled upon in response to Green Acres' Motion to Dismiss. 
On June 5, 1979, Judge Durham denied the Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the Plaintiffs, but it should be pointed out that this 
was done after receiving testimony from Jerry L. Cutshaw and Edward 
D. Smith which raised a question as to the possibility of some claim 
based upon estoppel. The same basis was alluded to by Judge Winder 
in his ultimate decision, and he actually fixed the amount of damages 
growing out of that claim. However, as to all of the other lien 
claimants, Judge Durham granted Navalco's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on June 18, 1979 as shown in her Order appearing in Volume 
II of the pleadings and orders at page 536. 
All of Judge Durham's rulings, on the basic question of 
whether the mere existence of the lessor-lessee relationship created 
a lien right, were consistent and identical. She clearly found that 
no such lien right existed. Only where there was evidence of some 
additional relationship or where there were some facts which might 
constitute an estoppel did she find any possibility of any right at 
all to recovery. 
We submit that this then became the law of the case. We 
further submit that Judge Winder was obligated to follow the law of 
the case as established by Judge Durham. His ruling that the basic 
agreements established a right in Plaintiffs against Defendant, 
Navalco of Utah, was clearly contrary to the law of the case as 
established by Judge Durham. 
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Judge Durham left open the question of whether there was 
a right by way of estoppel against Navalco of Utah and in favor of 
the Plaintiffs. Judge Winder, in his Memorandum Opinion, found that 
such a right existed in favor of Plaintiff, Interiors Contracting, 
Inc., in the amount of $582. We do not contest this decision and 
we think that it is correct only to the extent that an obligation 
between Navalco of Utah and Interiors Contracting, Inc. grew out 
of the conversation held about a week before Interiors completed 
its contract and that this is a right totally independent from 
-· 
the mechanics' lien statute. Furthermore, no right to attorney's 
fees could grow out of this right. We submit that the balance 
of Judge Winder's decision against Navalco of Utah is contrary 
to the law of the case as established by Judge Durham, is contrary 
to the statute and the law of Utah as pronounced most recently by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson 
case, and that ruling should be reversed. 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO FAIL TO AWARD 
JUDGMENT UPON THE CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT, 
NAVALCO OF UTAH, AGAINST DEFENDANT, GREEN ACRES 
OF AMERICA, INC. 
Judge Winder had Navalco of Utah's Cross Complaint against 
Green Acres of America, Inc. before him. It was clearly stated in 
the original pleadings filed by Navalco of Utah and furthermore, was 
reiterated in the pre-trial statement (please see Volume III of the 
compendium of pleadings and orders, page 715.) The following 
appears: 
-13-
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"This Defendant has filed a Cross Complaint against 
Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc. for (A) protection 
from any lien claimants against this Defendant or its title 
and, (B) reimbursement for the attorney's fees expended by 
this Defendant in the course of this action. It is our 
position that both of these obligations were imposed upon 
Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., by the terms of 
the lease agreement between these two parties." 
Inasmuch as the above-referred to lease agreement became an exhibit 
in the case (Exhibit 2-P), no further testimony was offered on this 
point. Therefore, once Judge Winder awarded Judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Navalco of Utah, we respect-
fully submit that it was his duty to then rule upon the Cross 
Complaint. 
POINT III 
JUDGE WINDER SO MISLED COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, NAVALCO 
OF UTAH, IN HIS STATEMENTS IN REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF 
THE CASE THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
On March 6, 1980, Navalco filed a Motion for New Trial 
which appears in the compendium of pleadings, etc., in Volume III 
at page 896 et seq. Accompanying this Motion was the Affidavit of 
Glen M. Hatch appearing at page 899 et seq. The basis of this 
Motion was the assertion that Judge Winder led counsel for Navalco 
to believe that he would follow the law of the case as set down by 
Judge Durham. We furnish the following statements in the record by 
Judge Winder which led Mr. Hatch to believe that he was following 
the law of the case as established by Judge Durham: 
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1. Transcript, page 8, beginning on line 12 through page 
1, line 1: 
"THE COURT: So there is a default, in effect, against 
rungry Hawaiian but it hasn't been litigated against Navalco and 
Jreen Acres? 
Go ahead and put on your proof as to whether they are 
Liable. I know generally what the law is, but there would be no 
~oint in these two huge files if that had been adjudicated and it 
1asn't been. This has got to be at the instance of Navalco and, 
1s I understand the law, there has got to have been either a 
~ontract with them or an agency or something like that. I don't 
~hink unjust enrichment is sufficient. 
MR. ANDERSON: Implied contract. 
THE COURT: I don't think implied contract is enough and 
[ think Judge Durham so ruled. I think it is the law of the case 
Ln one of her decisions. 
Go ahead and put on whatever evidence you want. You have 
~ot a judgment against Hungry Hawaiian which, I guess, is worthless. 
[f you want to get a judgment against Navalco, put on some evidence 
:hat Navalco either authorized these repairs or something that con-
;ractually or agency-wise will cause liability in them and do the 
;ame with Green Ac res • " 
2. Transcript, page 117-118, beginning at line 14: 
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Anderson, I think I understand or 
tave read these abstract principles, but what it comes down to, as 
-15-
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I understand it in your claim as against Navalco, is whether what 
you did was at the instance of Navalco or any other person acting 
with authority of Navalco. What I would like you to tell me is to 
summarize the evidence that you--or give me the highlights of what 
you think supports that. 
Certainly, if Navalco had absolutely nothing to do with 
these improvements being put in, the mere fact that they are put 
into the building, that they enhance the value of the building, is 
not sufficient under Utah laws as I understand it. It has got to 
be done at the instance of the owner or some person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. 
In the Dugger case, the contractors entered into a sub-
contract and material was furnished to the subcontractor, clearly. 
I mean, that is covered by the lien statute. 
But what is it in this case, factually, that would cause 
Navalco to be responsible to your two clients? That is what would 
be the most helpful to me to know, what it is that they have done 
that fits this test." 
3. Transcript, page 119, beginning at line 18: 
"THE COURT: Well, but how does that benefit Navalco though? 
If I lease my house and--
MR. ANDERSON: It is their building. They own the building. 
THE COURT: I understand. They have entered into a lease. 
The amount they are going to get is fixed. It doesn't benefit them 
in any way if it is improved or not improved. It benefits the tenant. 
-16-
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If I lease my house to somebody and it is not improved, in 
other words, it is just a shell of a house and I know they are going 
to fix it up, then--
MR. ANDERSON: You are happy if they fix it up because the 
house is going to revert to you when it is finished. 
THE COURT: Is it your understanding under Utah law that if 
I enter into a lease of ten years on my house and I know some repairs 
are going to be put into that house, substantial repairs, that if 
they are put in there, that I am responsible for them under the Lien 
Statute? 
Honor. 
MR. ANDERSON: If you know that they are put in there. 
THE COURT: That is your understanding of the law? 
MR. ANDERSON: Either express or implied contract, Your 
THE COURT: No. I own a house. 
MR. ANDERSON: You own it. 
THE COURT: And I lease it for ten years to somebody and 
that person, they are permitted to make repairs. And let's say 
that I have to give my consent to the repairs that are made. 
All right. If repairs are made and if the tenant doesn't 
pay for them, they can lien the house and get it from me as the 
owner. Is that your understanding? 
MR. ANDERSON: That is my understanding of the Mechanic's 
Lien Law and the Utah Supreme Court interpretation. 
-17-
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THE COURT: I know you are dealing with something else, 
Mr. Hatch. Do you agree? 
MR. HATCH: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: That the owner is liable? 
MR. HATCH: Oh, no. I agree with what you said. The first 
page of my argument--
THE COURT: I really am a little unclear, perhaps, and that 
is what I want to find out. 
But it is my understanding that under the facts that I just 
gave, that it isn't enough. Now obviously, there doesn't have to be 
a contractual relationship between the person who is trying to put 
the lien on and the person against whom the lien is asserted, or else 
the Lien laws would add nothing to the law of Utah. But it has to be 
at the instance and request. It doesn't have to rise to the level 
of a contract, but it doesn't attach simply because you own property. 
Otherwise, this wording, 'At the instance· of the owner or any other 
person acting by authority,' would be meaningless in the statute. 
If you eliminated that and you just had the language above that, 
then I suppose ownership alone would subject you to a lien to the 
extent of the interest the owner has in the property. But that 
isn't the Utah law, Mr. Anderson. That it what this case is all 
about, as I understand it. 
It is just what has been done at the instance and request 
of the owner." 
-18-
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4. Statements to the above effect also appear at page 29 
lines 18 through 27: 
"MR. ANDERSON: But the sublease of the lease of the build-
ing from the owner standing there having a conversation with the man 
who is putting labor and materials into the building--
THE COURT: That implicates the sublessee, but it doesn't 
have anything to do with the owner unless the owner has caused this 
person to be his agent or unless there is a contractual arrangement, 
as I understand the law. Maybe I am construing this too narrowly. 
Go ahead. Overruled. Go ahead with your questions." 
5. Page 100, line 29: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, let me just say this. The way 
that it appears, I don't think there is any question about the 
material and labor that went into that job. I think the only thing 
that is in issue, as I understand it, is really whether there is any 
kind of authority or any kind of agency or anything like that from 
Naval co." 
453: 
Mr. Hatch's Affidavit, page 900, Item 3, states: 
3. Affiant, who has practiced law for over 32 
years in the courts of the State of Utah and in the 
Federal Courts and many administrative tribunals, 
concluded therefrom that this established the law 
of the case. 
We quote from Moore's Federal Practice, Volume lB, page 
"The correct rule is well stated by Judge Lummus of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Peterson v. Hopson: 
-19-
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'A judge should hesitate to undo his own work ••. 
Still more should he hesitate to undo the work of 
another judge •••• But until final judgment or decree 
there is no lack of power, and occasionally the power 
may properly be exercised.'" 
This statement of the law is certainly consistent with Mr. Hatch's 
reaction to Judge Winder's comments. 
Relying upon the Judge's statement, Mr. Hatch stated in 
Item 6, on page 901, as follows: 
"6. At the close of the testimony, Miss Polich repre-
senting Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., indicated 
to the Court that she had a tentative agreement with Affiant 
which would obviate further testimony or argument concerning 
the Cross Complaint of Defendant, Navalco of Utah, against 
Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc."· 
It should be noted that the reference is to a "tentative 
agreement." As appears from the draft of that agreement which was 
prepared after the hearing and submitted to Mr. Hatch after the 
hearing (see Volume III of pleadings, etc., page 933 et seq.), that 
it was based upon the assumption that Judge Winder would follow the 
law of the case as to the question of a lien running against Navalco 
of Utah. 
We respectfully submit that the combination of these facts 
created circumstances of surprise, which induced Mr. Hatch to make 
no further statement in support of the Cross Complaint against 
Green Acres of America. It certainly did not constitute an abandon-
ment of that Cross Complaint and, therefore, a new trial should be 
granted on the Cross Complaint. 
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POINT IV 
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO REFUSE TO AMEND THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT SO 
THAT THEY WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT, NAVALCO 
OF UTAH, ON ITS CROSS COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT, 
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC. 
Navalco filed a Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment and award judgment to Navalco of Utah 
against Green Acres of America, Inc. upon Navalco's Cross Complaint. 
This appears beginning at page 838 of Volume III of the compendium 
of pleadings. 
We take the position that Judge Durham who heard this 
matter after Judge Winder had left the Third District Bench could 
simply have granted the order based upon the facts of the case. 
Section 78-7-21, U.C.A., Replacement Volume 9A provides: 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy in office of judge. -
No proceeding in any court of justice, in any action or 
special proceeding pending therein, is affected by a 
vacancy in the office of all or any of the judges, or 
by the failure of a term thereof. 
Rule 63 Rules of Civil Procedure, U.C.A., Replacement Volume 9B, 
page 289, provides: 
If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, 
a judge before whom an action has been tried is un-
able to perform the duties to be performed by the 
court under these Rules after a verdict is returned 
or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, 
then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned 
to the court in which the action was tried may perform 
these duties; but if such other judge is satisfied 
that he cannot perform those duties because he did 
not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he 
may in his discretion grant a new trial. 
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However, Judge Durham ruled that it was necessary for counsel for 
Navalco to "submit the issue to the Court." She took the position 
that by failing to "submit" the issue, Navalco abandoned it. We 
respectfully urge this Court to rule otherwise. This matter was 
in the pleadings, was raised in the pre-trial statement and all 
of the proof necessary for consideration of the issue was before 
the Court. Entirely aside from the unique circumstances which 
induced counsel for Navalco to fail to say anything further on 
the matter, we think the Court should rule that the matter was 
before the Trial Court and since Judge Winder failed to dispose 
of it, then Judge Durham should have acted upon the question. 
We also respectfully suggest that the very matters raised 
in our Motion for New Trial were ample basis for Judge Durham to 
amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as re-
quested. She was apprised by Mr. Hatch's Affidavit of the fact 
that the tentative agreement had not been reduced to writing and 
presented to Mr. Hatch prior to the completion of the argument in 
the case and that further, it included provisions upon which the 
parties had never reached agreement. This coupled with the fact 
that Judge Winder led counsel to believe that the question simply 
would not be raised is, we submit, sufficient basis for her to 
order the amendment in question. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of Judge Durham that none of the lien claimants 
furnished materials or services at the instance of Appellant or any 
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other person acting by Appellant's authority as agent, contractor or 
otherwise and, therefore, not entitled to a lien against Appellant's 
interest became the "law of the case" and should have been adhered to 
by Judge Winder. Moreover, the documents relied upon by Judge Winder 
to establish Plaintiffs' lien by "implied authorization" cannot be 
construed as such under the test heretofore established in the Zions 
decision (supra). We, therefore, submit that the judgment of Judge 
Winder should be reversed. 
The law of the case was correctly established by Judge 
Durham in her rulings affecting most of the parties. Insofar as the 
question presented to Judge Durham was whether the Plaintiffs were 
entitled to a lien against the fee interest of Defendant, Navalco of 
Utah, nothing new was established at the trial which should have 
warranted Judge Winder, in effect, to reverse Judge Durham. We 
submit that no case was made out establishing such a lien right and 
it should have been denied. 
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, clearly stated a 
Cross Complaint against Defendant-Respondent, Green Acres of America, 
Inc., in its pleadings and reasserted the matter in the pre-trial 
memorandum. Furthermore, ample evidence for granting judgment on 
the basis of the lease, Exhibit 2, was before the Court and judgment 
on the Cross Claim should have been awarded. 
If the Court reverses the Trial Court's decision that a 
lien existed against Navalco of Utah, the Court should remand the 
~ase to the trial court for a determination of the amount of 
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attorney's fees, which should be awarded Appellant, Navalco of Utah, 
under the Cross Complaint. 
Finally, in the event that the Court fails to reverse the 
judgment of Judge Winder granting a lien against Navalco of Utah, 
the Court should remaind the case to the lower court for trial of 
Appellant's Cross Claim. 
DATED this ').._ °! ~ay of July, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
G. ASLAM 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
By·~~~ 
GfJM:HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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